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David ScoƩ, 
Indo‐Paciﬁc analyst for 
the NATO Defense 
College FoundaƟon, 
explains that “New 
Zealand is seeking out 
“Indo‐Paciﬁc” 
cooperaƟon with these 
four parƟcular 
“partners” (Japan, 
United States, India, 
Australia) over shared 
concerns about China.” 
TradiƟonally, New Zealand’s strategic focus has been on Australia and the South Paciﬁc. As recently as 18 
October, 2018, Ben King, New Zealand’s Deputy Secretary for Americas and Asia said that “the term Indo‐
Paciﬁc may not resonate in New Zealand yet.” And this despite a July 2018 Strategic Defence Policy 
Statement that already pinpointed New Zealand’s “Indo‐Paciﬁc partners reinforcing the rules based 
order” as being Australia, India, Japan and the United States. It is worth noƟng that the Strategic Defence 
Policy Statement gave lengthy details on the threat posed by China; in its MariƟme Silk Road push into the 
Indian Ocean, its militarizaƟon of the South China Sea, and its push into the Paciﬁc islands. Events from 
August 2019 to February 2020 reinforce that New Zealand is seeking out “Indo‐Paciﬁc” cooperaƟon with 
these four parƟcular “partners” (Japan, United States, India, Australia) over shared concerns about China. 
Thus, on August 1, 2019, the Oﬃce of the Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs and Trade signaled oﬃcial adopƟon 
of “Indo‐Paciﬁc” foreign policy thinking in a press release aﬃrming New Zealand’s plan on “engaging with 
our regional partners on the challenges facing the Indo‐Paciﬁc and discussing how to deepen our 
cooperaƟon.”  
With regard to Japan, the summit held on September 19, 2019 between New Zealand’s Prime Minister 
Jacinda Ardern and her counterpart Shinzo Abe pursued an Indo‐Paciﬁc focus. The resulƟng Joint 
Statement, Ɵtled Taking the Japan‐New Zealand Strategic CooperaƟve Partnership to the Next Level, 
recorded that “the two leaders reiterated their commitment to working proacƟvely together to maintain 
and promote a free and open Indo‐Paciﬁc region for ensuring a free, open and rules‐based internaƟonal 
order.” In addiƟon, “the two leaders raised concerns about the situaƟon in the South China Sea,” with 
“parƟcular regard to land reclamaƟon, militarizaƟon of such islands,” and the need to “uphold 
internaƟonal law, freedom of navigaƟon and overﬂight.” 
With regard to the United States, New Zealand’s Minister for Defense Ron Mark met his American 
counterpart Mark Esper in Washington, D.C. on January 25, 2020. The New Zealand Ministry of Defense 
noted that “the main focus of the meeƟng was to discuss challenges that New Zealand and the United 
States share in the Indo‐Paciﬁc region.” From Washington, Mark ﬂew to Hawaii, his ﬁrst visit to the Indo‐
Paciﬁc Command (USINDOPACOM) and discussed explicit security challenges in the Indo‐Paciﬁc. 
A signiﬁcant Indo‐Paciﬁc re‐adjustment was shown with India on February 27, 2020 when the Foreign 
Minister Winston Peters met his Indian counterpart, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, with Peters noƟng that 
“India is a priority relaƟonship for New Zealand. We share common democraƟc tradiƟons, growing two‐
way trade, extensive people‐to‐people links, and a common strategic interest in the Indo‐Paciﬁc region.” 
Revealingly, Peters then delivered a lengthy speech, Ɵtled The Indo‐Paciﬁc: From Principles to 
Partnerships, at the Indian Council of World Aﬀairs. He reﬂected on “the emergence of the Indo‐Paciﬁc as 
a strategic concept” and “the strategic reality of our shared Indo‐Paciﬁc region;” in which “New Zealand 
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has direct interests in the Indo‐Paciﬁc’s security” in the Paciﬁc and in the Indian Ocean. Links with 
India were highlighted; “the emergence of the Indo‐Paciﬁc terminology recognizes these common 
interests. It unites New Zealand and India in a shared strategic geography. This is reﬂected in the 
alignment of our Indo‐Paciﬁc policies.” Speciﬁc values were underpinned: “like India, we also want to 
see an Indo‐Paciﬁc that is open and inclusive; that is commiƩed to transparency; that respects 
sovereignty”; that “adheres to internaƟonal law; that upholds freedoms of overﬂight and navigaƟon;” 
in which “we also know that safeguarding these principles and responding to the security concerns of 
our region will require collecƟve acƟon.” These pinpointed values were implicitly phrased with China 
and the South China Sea in mind. The call for “collecƟve acƟon” implied New Zealand’s readiness to 
make a contribuƟon. 
Finally, New Zealand’s relaƟonship with Australia, tradiƟonally focused on the South Paciﬁc, also 
expanded its scope in the meeƟng between the Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and her counterpart 
ScoƩ Morrison on February 28, 2020. Their media statement maintained convergence and 
cooperaƟon in the South Paciﬁc, but had a wider framework. Thus, they talked of their “mutual eﬀort 
to support an open, inclusive and prosperous Indo‐Paciﬁc region,” “reaﬃrmed the beneﬁts of open 
markets and inclusive regional economic integraƟon in the Indo‐Paciﬁc;” “agreed on the importance 
of strengthening regional insƟtuƟons in the Indo‐Paciﬁc that promote habits of cooperaƟon on shared 
challenges, reinforce respect for internaƟonal law;” and “welcomed ASEAN’s adopƟon of its Outlook 
on the Indo‐Paciﬁc.” Common concerns were elaborated over the South China Sea. With China in 
mind, they “expressed serious concern over developments in the South China Sea;” including “the 
conƟnued militarizaƟon of disputed features, and destabilizing behavior at sea;” “reaﬃrmed the 
importance of freedom of navigaƟon and overﬂight;” and urged claimants to “resolve mariƟme 
disputes peacefully, in accordance with internaƟonal law, parƟcularly the United NaƟons ConvenƟon 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).” 
Looking forward, New Zealand will probably remain focused on the South Paciﬁc (the focus of its 
“Paciﬁc Reset” announced in March 2018) as the area for most eﬀecƟve use of its modest economic 
and military projecƟon; including cooperaƟon there with the United States, Australia and Japan. New 
Zealand parƟcipaƟon in the U.S.‐Australia‐Japan Blue Dot Network (BDN) infrastructure iniƟaƟve may 
be a development in countering China’s MariƟme Silk Road push. However, New Zealand may well 
reinforce its own input in Southeast Asia, where the New Zealand‐Singapore Enhanced Partnership 
entering into force in January 2020 facilitates a greater New Zealand security presence. This increased 
New Zealand presence may be manifested through the Five Power Forces Arrangement (FPDFA), 
which brings together Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK. It might also be 
manifested in some supporƟve New Zealand freedom of navigaƟon deployment into the South China 
Sea. There may well also be greater eﬀort by New Zealand to work with India in the Paciﬁc and in the 
Indian Ocean. Finally, given New Zealand’s invocaƟon of the Indo‐Paciﬁc in its dealings with the 
Australia, India, and the United States (the “Quad” set up again in November 2017), there may be 
closer New Zealand involvement with the Quad mechanism, which would be welcomed by all current 
Quad members.  
“Looking forward, New 
Zealand will probably 
remain focused on the 
South Paciﬁc as the 
area for most eﬀecƟve 
use of its modest 
economic and military 
projecƟon” 
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